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Recitation, as required by C.P.L.R. § 2219(a), of the papers considered in review of this
motion.
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Notice of Motion and Affidavits Annexed
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Answering Affidavits
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Other 2-6
After oral argument and upon the foregoing cited papers, the decision and order on this
motion is as follows:

BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL POSTURE
2115 Washington Realty ("Petitioner"), commenced this summary nonpayment
proceeding against Johnathan Braxton ("Respondent"), in August of 2019. The Petition
sought unpaid rent in the amount of $3,233.20 and alleged that the subject premises are
subject to the Rent Stabilization Law. Both sides are represented by counsel.
Respondent failed to answer, and Petitioner obtained a default judgment on or about
October 3, 2019. A warrant of eviction issued on or about October 13, 2019. Respondent
obtained an Order to Show Cause seeking to vacate the default judgment, returnable on
November 14, 2019. On that date, the Respondent, represented by counsel, entered into a
stipulation, which, rather than vacating the default judgment, merely stayed execution of the
warrant of eviction to December 31, 2019, for payment of $4,037.90 and current rent.
[*2]Respondent filed a second Order to Show Cause, returnable on January 31, 2020, seeking
a further stay of execution of the warrant, but not seeking to vacate the default judgment. On
that date, the parties entered into a stipulation staying execution of the warrant of eviction to
February 28, 2020, for payment of $1,071.88 and February's rent. Respondent defaulted on
that stipulation and Petitioner alleges a notice of eviction was mailed to the Respondent on or
about March 6, 2020.
On March 16, 2020, the New York courts closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
temporarily ceasing all in-person operations, except in emergency essential operations. After
several months, the court resumed hearing cases that had been commenced prior to the start of
the pandemic and Petitioner filed a DRP-213 motion seeking leave to execute on the issued
warrant. The motion was calendared for November 13, 2020 and was adjourned several times
for opposition. Respondent invoked the Tenant Safe Harbor defense [FN1] and the matter was
set down for a hearing to April 13, 2021. On April 13, 2021, pursuant to the COVID-19
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Emergency and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2020 ("CEEFPA"), Respondent made an oral
application seeking the vacatur of the default judgment.

The Law and Its Application
Part A, § 7 of CEEFPA entitled Default Judgments states the following:
"No court shall issue a judgment in any proceeding authorizing a warrant of
eviction against a respondent who has defaulted, or authorize the enforcement of an
eviction pursuant to a default judgment, prior to August 31, 2021, without first
holding a hearing after the effective date of this act upon motion of the petitioner.
The petitioner or an agent of the petitioner shall file an affidavit attesting that the
petitioner or the petitioner's agent has served notice of the date, time, and place of
such hearing on the respondent, including a copy of such notice. If a default
judgment has been awarded prior to the effective date of this act, the default
judgment shall be removed and the matter restored to the court calendar upon the
respondent's written or oral request to the court either before or during such hearing
and an order to show cause to vacate the default judgment shall not be required."
In opposition to Respondent's request for vacatur of the default judgment, Petitioner
notes that Respondent's counsel entered into two separate agreements after the entry of the
default judgment. Petitioner argues that these agreements incorporated the default judgment
by reference, and that by entering into these agreements Respondent has ratified the
judgment, which should no longer be viewed as a default judgment subject to vacatur under
CEEFPA. Petitioner argues any vacatur of these stipulations must instead fall under the
traditional standards and analysis.
In support of their application, Respondent argues that statutory text in question is
unambiguous and that the vacatur of default judgments is meant to apply to all proceedings
[*3]without exception. In support, Respondent cites Ketcham Assoc LLC v Gil (2021 NY Slip
Op 30780[U] [Civ Ct, Queens County 2021]). In Ketcham, Petitioner obtained a default
judgment after inquest prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. The court in Ketcham found that
removal of the default judgment was appropriate. The instant proceeding, however, has
several notable differences that distinguish it from the procedural posture of Ketcham. In
Ketcham, while there was litigation prior to the entry of the default judgment against
Respondent, it appears that no litigation took place subsequent to the entry of the default
judgment but prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. In the matter at bar, Petitioner also obtained a
https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_21183.htm
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default judgment and a warrant of eviction had issued prior to the commencement of the
COVID-19 pandemic. In contrast, however, Respondent filed an Order to Show Cause to
vacate the default judgment prior to the commencement of the COVID-19 pandemic, and
settled that Order to Show Cause as well as another - both with the benefit of counsel,
choosing to leave the default judgment in place and intact, and merely staying execution of
the warrant of eviction.
Similarly, Respondent also cites Webster Ave Affordable LLC v James (Civ Ct, Bronx
County, March 30, 2021, Jennings J., Index No. L & T 048791/19). In Webster Ave, Petitioner
also obtained a default judgment after inquest and no litigation took place after entry of the
judgment. Further, the court found Respondent was in need of a guardian ad litem. This
matter again differs from the case at bar in that while a default judgment was obtained, there
was no subsequent litigation that occurred after the issuance of the default judgment and
warrant of eviction but prior to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. Lastly, Respondent cites
Jenkins Portfolio Cos LLC v Grant (Civ Ct, New York County, May 5, 2021, Schneider J.,
Index No L & T 73223/19). The facts of Jenkins are consistent with those previously cited
where Petitioner obtained a default judgment with no litigation after the issuance of the
judgment but before the commencement of the pandemic and inapposite to the matter at hand.

COVID-19 Emergency and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2020 Analysis
The intent of the legislation as stated in the CEEFPA is "to avoid as many evictions and
foreclosures as possible for people experiencing a financial hardship during the COVID-19
pandemic or who cannot move due to an increased risk of severe illness or death of COVID19." Consistent with this intent are the layers of protection in obtaining and executing on a
default judgment during this pandemic period, such as the motion required by Part A, §7,
alerting Respondent to the time and date default would be sought, the service of hardship
declaration, and the ease in which such default may be "removed." Jenkins Portfolio Cos LLC
v Grant (Civ Ct, New York County, May 5, 2021, Schneider J., Index No L & T 73223/19), as
cited in support by Respondent, expresses this intent, as it states, "[t]he Legislature's intent to
insure that tenants are not evicted on default (emphasis added) during the pandemic period."
At the onset of its statutory analysis this court guides itself on the principle that "all parts
of the statue are to be read and construed together to determine the legislative intent." (Gaden
https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_21183.htm
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v Gaden, 29 NY2d 80, 86 [1971]). Accordingly, this court follows the analysis of the recent
decision from Hon. Slade in Stuyvesant Manor Inc v Francisco Zayas (72 Misc 3d 1203[A],
2021 NY Slip Op 50607[U][Civ Ct, Kings County 2021). In Zayas, Hon. Slade opined the
COVID-19 Emergency and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2020 should have each section
read to track the various stages of a proceeding as is delineated in the RPAPL. Essentially, the
procedural posture of each case dictates what relief is available. Accordingly, the oral
application to remove a default judgement is only available where Petitioner seeks a default
judgment or seeks authorization to a enforce one pursuant to CEEFPA, Part A, §7. This
[*4]analysis is consistent with other parts of CEEFPA. For example, the effect of a hardship
declaration differs depending on the procedural posture of each specific matter. If no warrant
has issued, CEEFPA Part A, §6 applies, and the proceeding is stayed from any further
litigation until the expiration of the statue, currently slated to expire on August 31, 2021. If a
warrant has issued, on the other hand, Part A, §8 entitled "Post warrant of eviction" provides
guidance and permits litigation to proceed but stays execution of the warrant until the
expiration of the statue. As such, the provisions of CEEFPA, Part A should be read as
guideposts as to what is permissible under the Act depending on the procedural posture of the
proceeding and how to address cases in various stages of litigation.
In the case at bar, removal of the judgment under Part A, §7 of CEEFPA would be
inconsistent with the posture of this proceeding. Petitioner is not moving to obtain a default
judgment or the authority to enforce one. The distinction, albeit a fine one, is material. While
the underlying judgment in the instant proceeding is a default judgment, Petitioner's DRP-213
motion, seeks to execute an existing warrant where litigation has already contemplated the
possibility of vacatur of the default judgment, as evidenced by Respondent's prior request to
the court. The parties, however, agreed to abandon said relief in favor allowing the default
judgment to remain in place and instead agreed simply to a stay in the execution of the
warrant of eviction for a payment of arrears. The basis of Petitioner's DRP motion is that
Petitioner should be allowed to execute the warrant based on a default of Respondent's
obligations where Respondent, with the benefit of counsel, had ample opportunity to vacate
the default judgment but instead agreed to leave it in place. Essentially, Petitioner seeks to
execute on the warrant of eviction based on a default in obligations under a pre-pandemic
two-attorney stipulation. As such, the procedural posture of this proceeding more
appropriately falls under CEEFPA Part A, §8 entitled "Post warrant of eviction."
Part A, §8(a)(i) of CEEFPA in relevant part states the following
https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_21183.htm
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"In any eviction proceeding in which an eviction warrant has been issued prior to
the effective date of this act, but has not yet been executed as of the effective date
of this act, including eviction proceedings filed on or before March 7, 2020, the
court shall stay the execution of the warrant at least until the court has held a status
conference with the parties."
This section of CEEFPA does not provide the relief of seeking the removal of a default
judgment by merely oral or written application. However, nothing in this section of CEEFPA
precludes Respondent from seeking the vacatur of a default judgment and/or subsequent
stipulations under the traditional framework either.
An overview of the Court's treatment of default judgments during the COVID-19
pandemic supports this analysis. DRP-205, effective March 13, 2020, instructed the clerks not
to enter default judgments in any residential proceeding until the directive was rescinded. The
directive was rescinded on October 12, 2020. AO 68/20, issued March 16, 2020, provided
that "[a]ll eviction proceedings and pending eviction orders shall be suspended statewide,"
and further stated that "the New York City Housing Court has been directed not to issue new
eviction warrants when a party has not appeared in court." AO 127/20, issued June 18, 2020,
further suspended eviction proceedings commenced on or before March 16, 2020. DRP 213,
effective August 12, 2020, stated "[c]consistent with Administrative Orders 160/20 and
115/20, no adverse action (i.e., no defaults) shall be taken based upon the failure to file an
answer in an eviction proceeding, or based upon the failure of a party to submit responsive
papers to a motion [*5]submitted through EDDS, absent specific order of the Court." Prior to
the passing of CEEFPA, no mechanism was available to seek default judgments or enforce
them. Thus, only through CEEFPA, Part A, §7 could a petitioner seek or enforce a default
judgment. This triggers the aforementioned relief of "removing" a default judgment by an oral
or written application and dispenses with the requirement that a formal Order to Show Cause
be filed to request such relief. Where, however, as here, the parties have had ample
opportunity to litigate the propriety of the default judgment prior to the COVID-19 pandemic,
the proceeding remains in a different procedural posture, and would fall under CEEFPA Part
A, §8.

Conclusion

https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_21183.htm
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Respondent's application to remove the default judgment is denied. Respondent entered
into two stipulations after the entry of the default judgment, and Petitioner has not moved this
court under CEEFPA, Part A, §7. Accordingly, this proceeding cannot be viewed in the
procedural posture that would afford it relief under Part A, §7 of CEEFPA. This application is
denied without prejudice. The matter is adjourned to August 31 , 2021at2:30pm for a hearing
pursuant to the Tenant Safe Harbor Act. This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.

Dated: July 9, 2021

Hon. Bryant Tovar

Judge, Housing Part C
Footnotes

Footnote l:On June 30, 2020, New York State Governor Cuomo signed into law the Tenant
Safe Harbor Act (S.8192B), or Chapter 127 of the laws of2020. The Act prevents courts from
issuing possessory judgments or warrants of eviction during the COVID-19 covered period
for the non-payment of rent that accrues or becomes due during the COVID-19 period for
those who have suffered financial hardship due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 2020 NY Law ch
127 § 2(2)(b)(i)-(iv).
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